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Sociology of Critique or Critical Theory?  
 
Luc Boltanski and Axel Honneth in 
Conversation with Robin Celikates1 
 
 
Luc Boltanski, Axel Honneth, and Robin Celikates 
(Translated by Simon Susen) 
 
The ‘sociology of critique’ and ‘critical theory’ offer different perspectives on 
the phenomenon of critique. The former approach has been developed by Luc 
Boltanski, as well as by other members of the Groupe de Sociologie Politique et 
Morale (GSPM), with the aim of providing an alternative to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
‘critical sociology’. The latter approach has been developed further by Axel 
Honneth, who proposes a ‘theory of recognition’, and whose work descends 
from the tradition of the Frankfurt School. Is critique, first and foremost, an 
achievement of ‘ordinary’ actors or a task of theory? What is the relationship 
between theory and practice? How can theory be critical and, at the same 
time, draw upon actors’ experiences and interpretations? These questions, as 
well as the – partly complementary and partly conflicting – answers given by 
the aforementioned approaches, both of which are crucial to contemporary 
debates in social philosophy, play a pivotal role in the following conversation. 
 
I 
Robin Celikates: Let us begin by reflecting upon the genesis of the two 
approaches. How have the sociology of critique and the theory of recognition developed 
as distinct paradigms? What role have diverging currents of thought, empirical 
issues, and specific intellectual constellations played in this respect? On the 
one hand, we have the tradition of critical theory and particularly its recent 
reorientation, proposed by Jürgen Habermas, as well as a certain dissatisfaction 
with the formal-pragmatic strategy, which suffers from a significant degree
  
 
of ‘de-substantialization’ and ‘de-sociologization’. On the other hand, we 
find Pierre Bourdieu’s critical sociology and the confrontation with empirical 
problems, which have led to the development of a new theoretical vocabulary 
aimed at making the description of certain social phenomena possible in the 
first place. 
 
Luc Boltanski: I struggle with grand theoretical lines of development, 
especially at the moment, because – to borrow an expression used by Albert 
Hirschman – I am immersed in a phase characterized by a ‘propensity to self- 
subversion’. It is nonetheless possible to suggest that the conceptual horizon 
of my works reflects a project that I will probably never be able to accomplish, 
namely the development of a theoretical framework that integrates French 
critical sociology, which for me – as one of Bourdieu’s long-standing research 
assistants – has been a key source of inspiration, and the so-called pragmatic 
sociology of critique, which I, together with some of my colleagues, have been 
developing since the 1980s. The dogmatization of theory in the social sciences 
should be avoided. The kind of scenario to which this can lead is something I 
have directly experienced in the Bourdieu circle. Bourdieu himself sought to 
offer a closed theoretical edifice. Yet, this is not a good idea, because a theory 
must always remain open, incomplete, and underdetermined. 
Bourdieu’s oeuvre is the burden we have to bear, just as the Frankfurt 
School is the Frankfurter’s burden. We cannot simply follow the prescribed 
path; but, at the same time, we cannot brush these intellectual traditions aside. 
We should never forget, though, that sociology is never exclusively about theory 
but is always also about politics – this is especially true for these two traditions. 
Nevertheless, my critique of Bourdieu is a theoretical, rather than a political, 
one. The sociology of critique is not aimed at the dismissal of critique, as, 
for instance, demanded by Bruno Latour, who seeks to break with the post- 
Marxist project altogether.2 It seems to me that the point is to acknowledge 
that we need to take some kind of detour, in order to understand the practice 
of critique and, thus, comprehend why it is so difficult to criticize. 
 
Robin Celikates: What exactly is your main point of criticism regarding 
Bourdieu’s framework? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Bourdieu’s approach is characterized by the tension  
between the positivist belief in science and his genuine indignation regarding 
the existence of social inequalities. As in Marxism, in his writings we are 
confronted with an antagonism between positivism and the pursuit of 
emancipation, as witnessed in the eighteenth century. In Bourdieu, however, 
there is not even any space for the possibility of people becoming conscious of
  
 
their situation, let alone for revolution. On the contrary, he always emphasizes 
the role of people’s unconscious. Similar to many other theorists of the 1960s 
who defend a combination of Marxism and Durkheimianism, Bourdieu takes 
the view that actors never act consciously. At the same time, he implies that 
they are equipped with a kind of internal computer system, which enables 
them to make strategic calculations and provides them with particular 
praxeological options. These two assumptions lead to a ‘theory of the split 
actor’: on the one hand, a totally unconscious actor, whose motives, especially 
those of a moral nature, do not have anything to do with reality; on the other 
hand, a kind of ‘inner man’ (as Adam Smith once affirmed), who functions 
like a computer and constantly makes calculations. Similar to the theory of 
the avant-garde, this perspective creates an enormous discrepancy between, on 
the one hand, unconscious and deluded actors, and, on the other hand, conscious 
and critical sociologists, who – owing to their science and their methods – are 
capable of unmasking the truth and thereby enlighten other people. 
The practice of mutual admonition and correction – which corresponds to 
this view and which is, for example, common amongst monks – also existed in 
Bourdieu’s circle: after a meeting, it could happen that a colleague would come 
and say: ‘You talk about Adorno, but the truth is that you have no clue! What 
you are saying is the product of your proletarian “class habitus”. My task, as 
a social scientist, is to help you control the situation.’ On this account, social 
scientists have a monopoly on truth, and this is what secures them their avant- 
garde position. There is another problem arising from the attempt to combine 
Marx with Weber – an undertaking that is crucial to Bourdieu’s oeuvre. What 
Bourdieu learned from the pessimistic Weber is that every aspect of society is 
permeated by relations of domination. Such a diagnosis, however, implies that the 
project of critical theory is beset with major difficulties. 
Of course, it is possible to uncover concealed structures of  domination  
in a particular setting and to enlighten actors. Yet, after every unmasking 
process, new and other structures of  domination will emerge, which have  
not yet been grasped. Hence, the relationship between sociological description and 
critique is an extremely complicated one, especially because Bourdieu is not prepared 
to attribute an important role to morality in this context. Unlike Marxism, 
Bourdieu does not endorse a specific version of the philosophy of history, 
which could provide a foundation for the description of immanent contradictions. 
In fact, these contradictions simply do not exist in his universe. He describes 
a world permeated by  mechanisms of  domination, which are reproduced   
in largely unconscious, but nonetheless strategic, ways. What is the point of 
criticizing, however, if the world is ‘naturally’ like this and if, therefore, the 
most admirable revolutionary and moral intention can be reduced to an effect 
of false consciousness and is doomed to failure? 
  
 
Robin Celikates: In addition to emphasizing the importance of this tension, 
your critique of Bourdieu takes issue with his tendency to underestimate the 
various competences with which actors are equipped, notably with regard to 
their reflexive capacities. 
 
Luc Boltanski: In the Durkheimian tradition, there is a strict separation 
between actors, who are mere agents of social structures and who can be studied 
like savages living on an exotic island, and social scientists. The scientist is a kind 
of Sherlock Holmes: you give him or her a hint or some information, and he 
or she knows immediately what matters and is able to provide a class-theoretic 
analysis. This is not a particularly fruitful form of fieldwork! Good fieldwork 
presupposes the acceptance of uncertainties and of the fact that, often, one does not 
know what is going on. The belief in the clear-cut distinction between actors 
and scientists should have been lost no later than in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
this period, social reality was literally swamped with social-scientific schemes 
of thinking; in this sense, society became reflexive. When I embarked upon 
my fieldwork for The Making of a Class: Cadres in French Society,3 I went to talk 
to various associations and asked them about their respective definitions of 
manager [cadre]. They responded: ‘What? Have you not read Bourdieu and 
Touraine? Go and ask them!’ In other words, actors themselves had begun  
to use the works of sociologists as resources for the construction of their own 
group. 
 
Robin Celikates: What impact did this ‘discovery’ have on your own theory 
formation and empirical research? 
 
Luc Boltanski: The interplay between ‘ordinary’ actors, including the cognitive 
‘tools’ they use in everyday situations, on the one hand, and sociological schemes 
of thinking, on the other, became the main object of examination in the studies 
I carried out together with Laurent Thévenot. In these analyses, we were 
confronted with actors’ highly developed social competences, which enable 
them to participate in processes of criticism, dispute, and the exchange of arguments. I 
was particularly interested in the social form of ‘affair’, in which the 
denunciation of injustice is at stake. In this regard, paranoia plays a pivotal 
role. When I ask my daughter to take the mail out of the letterbox, I do not 
normally follow her, in order to check whether or not she embezzles any of the 
letters – but, actually, why not? The question of whether we are dealing with 
a justified doubt or with a pathology is not easy to answer. The same applies 
to denunciations of injustice. In order to get to the bottom of this, I examined 
thousands of letters which were addressed to the newspaper Le Monde and  
in which people complained about all sorts of things.4 Afterwards, I asked
  
 
a group of people to classify these letters according to a scale ranging from 
‘normal’ to ‘crazy’. What became evident from this study was that in situations 
in which issues of justice are crucial we find a sort of grammar of normality – a 
grammar that is used not only by those assessing the letters but also by those 
who wrote them. 
The question of normality plays a central role in everyday life, especially 
when claims to recognition and justice are at stake. It is difficult to imagine the force 
of the corresponding behavioural control mechanisms, even in places – such 
as universities – which are supposed to stimulate free exchange. The most 
effective way of rejecting a claim is not to argue against it, but to relegate it 
to the sphere of ‘the abnormal’. More radical demands are always in danger 
of being regarded as unreasonable, because, rather than fitting into the given 
reality, they draw upon personal experiences. If one cannot share them with 
other people, one is quickly perceived as ‘insane’, ‘perverse’, or ‘paranoid’. 
Thus, the problems of social injustice and critique must be conceived of in 
connection with the issue of psychiatry, as has been illustrated by the first 
generation of the Frankfurt School.5 Considering the rise of cognitive science in 
the present age, this is more urgent than ever before. Our theory, however, aims 
to operationalize not only our sense of normality but also our sense of justice. 
Therefore,  in  On  Justification,  we  have  tried  to  demonstrate  that  –  contrary 
to Bourdieu’s view – actors are not always deluded but – in certain situations – 
capable of using sociological arguments, of participating in practices of justification and 
criticism, and of developing an awareness of social reality.6 
 
II 
Robin Celikates: Critical theory is confronted with problems that  are  
similar to those described by Luc Boltanski in relation to Bourdieu’s sociology. 
To be exact, in critical theory there is also a tension between the diagnosis of a total 
system of domination and the objective of emancipation. This tension can easily evoke 
the danger of paternalism. What role does this problem play in the further 
development of critical theory, especially with regard to the paradigmatic turn 
proposed by Habermas? 
 
Axel Honneth:  It  becomes  more and more   obvious   to   me   that Luc 
Boltanski’s description of his relation to Bourdieu is somewhat 
homological to Habermas’s relation to early critical theory,  rather than  to 
my relation to Habermas. One of the main reasons for Habermas’s turning 
away from Adorno and Horkheimer’s approach is to be found     in their 
depreciation of ordinary actors’ competences. Their view of domination 
and instrumental reason obliges them to ignore the common
  
 
knowledge of participants. As a consequence, theoretical critique can 
hardly be justified. If it is impossible to relate to actors’ knowledge and 
perspective, then it is unfeasible to justify one’s own critique in an immanent 
manner, since one is forced to take an external perspective. Habermas  has 
always had the suspicion that early critical theory is incapable of 
formulating its own critique as a form of immanent criticism, because it 
manoeuvres itself into an external position. 
Total critique, according to which everything is domination and actors  
are governed by unconscious forces, poses the question of the justification  
of critique and illustrates that a different starting point is required. This is 
one of the reasons for Habermas’s paradigm shift, and this is why he began 
to search for theoretical resources allowing for a different interpretation of 
the structures underlying social life and social reproduction. The engagement 
with pragmatism – notably with John Dewey and with Hannah Arendt – has 
permitted him to analyse not only instrumental and strategic forms of reason, as 
well as the unconscious reproduction of domination, but also communicative 
forms of action, based on another type of rationality, which is embedded in 
linguistically mediated practices. Language, then, appears – primarily – not 
as an instrument of domination (as, for instance, in Herbert Marcuse’s One- 
Dimensional Man),7 but as a medium of communication and, hence, as a source 
of nonviolent action coordination. 
 
Robin Celikates: How has this configuration shaped the formation of your 
own conceptual framework? 
 
Axel Honneth: For me, exposure to this Habermasian  approach  was  
already so formative during my studies that I perceived the project of the 
early Frankfurt School as a theoretical impasse. As far as I was concerned, 
there was no going back to the time before Habermas’s ‘communicative turn’. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it would be fair to suggest that, in my case, the 
development of a distinct approach has been an intensification of, rather than 
a break with, the Habermasian model. Perhaps we can say that my relationship 
to Habermas is comparable to that of  the Left-Hegelians to Hegel. This is    
a significant difference with respect to the relationship between Boltanski 
and Bourdieu. Another important dissimilarity consists in the fact that my 
theoretical development has not been determined by empirical studies. I have 
sought to overcome the aporia of the Habermasian approach solely on the 
basis of theoretical reflections. 
I became aware of my discontent with Habermas only when I sought to 
identify the limitations of early critical theory myself. In a way, Habermas 
regards a sociological limitation of early critical theory as the main problem:
  
 
Adorno and Horkheimer create an utterly distorted picture of society, since 
they fail to understand that people act communicatively and participate in 
practices of justification. It took me some time to realize that precisely this 
criticism can be levelled against Habermas himself. His focus on the linguistic 
structure of  communication and on its underlying rationality means that    
he pays insufficient attention to the social experiences with which they are 
entangled. People’s everyday experiences have no place in Habermas’s 
theory. An important objective of The Critique of Power8 is to shed light on 
this limitation in early critical theory, in Foucault, but also, of course, in 
Habermas. 
 
Robin Celikates: How have you, in your reformulation of critical theory, 
tried to ascribe a more prominent role to human experience? How is it possible 
to avoid the decoupling of communication and quotidian experience, which 
appears to be part and parcel of Habermas’s universal pragmatics? 
 
Axel Honneth: What goes missing in the formalization of language is the 
moral dimension that is built into communicative processes. To my mind, the 
consideration of moral experience is essential to an accurate understanding of 
communicative action in particular and of social life in general. In addition to 
Hegel, social and historical studies – such as Barrington Moore’s Injustice and 
Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb’s Hidden Injuries of Class – were 
central to the development of my own theoretical framework.9 At that time, I 
even conducted a small empirical research project, which was inspired by 
insights borrowed from symbolic interactionism. It focused on the young 
working class in Berlin, and we asked ourselves how and where its members 
would situate themselves within the structure of society. It soon became clear 
that social shame is one of the most important motifs for adolescents. They 
did not find it easy to talk openly about their place in society. This illustrates 
that social hierarchy and relations based on recognition are intimately 
intertwined and that, furthermore, social theory needs to engage with 
experience of injustice and with the pursuit of recognition. 
To be sure, this does not mean that Habermas’s ‘linguistic turn’ needs to be 
reversed; it does mean, however, that it needs to be revised. For me, the key to a 
proper understanding of communicative  relations  has  been  Hegel’s  account 
of the ‘struggle for recognition’, which I discovered in the early Habermas.10 
Ironically, then, an idea  that  Habermas  himself  has  abandoned  enables  me 
to radicalize his approach. Yet, Hegel’s approach permits us not only to do 
justice to the central role of moral experience based on recognition, but also to 
demonstrate that conflict, rather than coordination, is a constitutive feature of 
communicative action. Communication is a form of moral conflict. Hence, the
  
 
paradigm of recognition replaces the paradigm of communication, thereby opening up a 
differently structured field of associations: what is decisive is the mutual attribution 
of normative status – that is, the fact that I grant others a particular normative 
authority by recognizing them. On this account, recognition is a process that, 
unlike the process of communication, necessarily involves moral experience. 
 
Robin Celikates: What role does conflict play in this theoretical framework? 
One may think that there is a tension between a perspective that focuses on 
the centrality of conflict, on the one hand, and a view that emphasizes the 
importance of moral experience, on the other. 
 
Axel Honneth: The concern with the struggle for recognition is linked to a 
revision of classical conceptions of conflict. For what is crucial in this context 
is the connection between ‘the conflictual’ and ‘the peaceful’. Conflicts over 
forms of sociality lie at the heart of human life forms. What is at stake in these 
conflicts is not distance in relation to others, or domination over others, but 
the desire for belonging, the desire to be a fully fledged member with equal 
rights. In this light, the concept of conflict acquires a meaning that is utterly 
different from the sense it is given in most conflict theories. To the extent that 
the interest in ‘being respected’ and the interest in ‘being part of a community’ 
are fundamental to conflict, we are dealing with conflicts over inclusion, rather 
than with conflicts over exclusion. In this regard, it is possible to draw not only 
on Hegel but also on Bourdieu, for whom the conflict over symbolic orders – 
despite his assumptions about something along the lines of a context of 
‘delusion’ – is central. 
Moreover,  what  we  find  in Bourdieu’s work  is  the intuition  that  these 
conflicts revolve around normative status, rather than economic interests, even 
if he goes on to analyse conflicts from an economic point of view, thereby 
reducing them to their utilitarian dimensions. This reductive interpretation 
dismisses the fact that, in reality, we are confronted with moral conflicts, in 
which normative dimensions – such as shame and recognition – constitute 
motivational driving forces. What my theory of recognition seeks to achieve, 
therefore, is not only to avoid certain Habermasian abstractions, but also to 
allow for an alternative understanding of the communicative infrastructure 
underlying social life. These revisions, however, all take place within the 
Habermasian paradigm; in this sense, they can be conceived of as a form of 
‘internal radicalization’. 
 
Robin Celikates: What are the consequences of this radicalization for the 




Axel Honneth: For Habermas, critique is possible only as immanent criticism. On 
this view, society as an object of critique already contains the type of reason that 
can serve as the standard for critique of existing social relations. Communicative 
reason realizes itself in historically developing forms of communication, from 
which we, as social theorists, can extract the yardsticks of critique. In this sense, 
Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action11 is an attempt to reconstruct 
rational forms of communication, which  serve  as the basis for  the critique  
of existing social pathologies. Surely, this is a variant of immanent criticism; 
‘immanent’ in this context, however, implies that critique draws not upon 
actors’ actual experiences but upon institutionalized principles. Hence, ‘immanence’, 
in this sense, does not mean what it used to mean in the intellectual tradition 
of the Frankfurt School; namely, that one has to refer to human experience in 
order to be able to justify critique. A less abstract and less formal conception of 
immanence requires us to engage with people’s competences and experiences. 
Social critique can be grounded not in communicative mechanisms of action 
coordination, but, rather, in experiences that are interrelated with certain forms 
of communication, such as recognition. 
 
Robin  Celikates:  Considering  Habermas’s  intellectual  development   
since the publication of his The Theory of Communicative Action, one gets the 
impression that, owing to his strong Kantian orientation, the concern with 
phenomena such as ideology, social pathologies, paradoxes, and contradictions 
has disappeared into the background. If I am right, your radicalization 
process is combined with a return not only to the early Habermas but also   
to particular ideas and intuitions of the early Frankfurt School. This relates 
not only to your interest in the aforementioned phenomena, but also to your 
theory’s strong engagement with social struggles for recognition, which reflects 
a commitment to locating theoretical criticism in the concrete realities shaped 
by social movements. You and Habermas appear to have gone down two very 
different paths. 
 
Axel  Honneth: Yes,  this is certainly true.  What has turned out to be crucial   
to the process of developing the model of the struggle for recognition is the 
thorough engagement with other disciplines, especially with psychoanalysis, 
moral psychology, and moral sociology. This is accompanied by a defence of ‘the 
earlier – Hegelian – Habermas’ against ‘the later – Kantian – Habermas’, as well 
as by a new interest in the early Frankfurt School. We can distinguish two forms of 
early critical theory: the functionalist version (developed especially by Horkheimer 
in the 1930s) and the anti-functionalist, normativist version (advocated particularly 
by somewhat marginalized theorists, such as Erich Fromm and Walter Benjamin). 
According to the second stance, society cannot be understood as a total context of
  
 
delusion; rather, it is traversed by diverse fractures. On this account, actors are not 
totally dominated, but they are able to make other – non-integrable – experiences. 
For Fromm, these are interactive experiences; for Benjamin, these are revolutionary 
experiences. And even in Adorno we find subversive forms of subjective experience. 
It is possible to draw upon these intuitions. Habermas and I have developed in 
two opposite directions: in his case, the sources of his own theory gradually fall 
into oblivion, Kant and Rawls take centre stage, his theory becomes more and 
more normative and, at the same time, less and less sociological; in my case, I seek 
to develop a radically Hegelian – that is, not only normative, but also profoundly 
‘social-theoretic’ – approach. 
 
III 
Robin Celikates: What are the commonalities, as well as the most important 
differences, between the sociology of critique and the theory of recognition? 
 
Luc Boltanski: The idea of ‘regimes of justification’ or ‘orders of justification’, 
developed in On Justification, is certainly comparable to the distinction Honneth 
draws between various ‘spheres of recognition’. Yet, we are interested – primarily – 
in the problem of order and hierarchy, as well as in their justification. Given  
the existence of diverse claims to recognition, the question is how one should be 
recognized. One can be recognized as ‘significant’ or ‘insignificant’, as ‘big’ or 
‘small’; and even if one is considered ‘small’, one has a place in society, although 
one may be dissatisfied with it. Thus, we need to examine not only recognition 
processes within a particular world, but also the ways in which they are related to 
issues arising from position, hierarchy, and order, which define how one is situated in this 
world. In other words, recognition is not the end of the conflict; on the contrary, 
it leads to new indeterminacies, disputes, and clashes. If one takes actors – including 
their demands and arguments – seriously, then uncertainties come to light in their 
quarrels. For instance, what may be discussed is the question of whether or not 
the dismissed employee was indeed irresponsible, or the question of whether  
or not a worker who may be hired is really competent to do the job.  We  do 
not know. This is why socially institutionalized tests are necessary: they make 
it possible to reduce the uncertainty experienced by human actors; and, in the 
best-case scenario, they may resolve a dispute. 
 
Robin Celikates: What role does common sense play in a theory that puts 
people’s reflexive capacities at centre stage? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Wittgenstein, pragmatism, and ethnomethodology accord an 
important role to common sense, and I have been strongly influenced by them.
  
 
To a large extent, though, I have remained a Durkheimian: I believe less and less in 
common sense. In the social sciences – notably in social and cultural theory, but also in 
game theory – it is customary to attach great importance to people’s spontaneous 
capacity to come together, to understand one another, and to develop – literally – a 
common sense. Habermas, for example, places too much faith in language and 
the possibilities of action coordination presumably derived from it. 
The  orders  of  justification  [cités]  that  we  analyse  in  On  Justification  are  a 
way of limiting common sense: within the context of a cité, certain arguments 
are permitted and relevant, whereas others are not. We are dealing with 
historical constructions in which language can be used in very different  
ways and in which the same word – for instance, ‘just’ or ‘fair’ – can acquire 
utterly different meanings. In this sense, our approach is also structuralist, 
rather than simply pragmatic. Moreover, orders of justification are not purely 
cognitive formations, but always grounded in objects related to them. Hence, 
the micro/macro issue presents itself in a new light. Are actors thrown into 
an already constructed world, in which possibilities of action are extremely 
limited (as in structuralism)? Or, should we start from the actors’ perspective 
and their situational world-constitutive practices (as in pragmatism and 
ethnomethodology)? Both descriptions are correct. Of course, actors 
experiencing concrete situations are not only exposed to an already constructed 
world, but they also change it. Integration of these two approaches, however, 
remains to be undertaken. 
 
Robin  Celikates: One can get the impression that, in a way,  the sociology  
of critique proceeds in a positivist manner and that, therefore, it deliberately 
abandons the claim of being ‘critical’ itself. 
 
Luc Boltanski: It is true that the attempt to move away from Bourdieu has 
led to a strong positivist position. Initially, all we sought to achieve was to offer 
the best possible description of a particular type of social situation. In order to 
accomplish this, we have borrowed ideas from Noam Chomsky’s linguistic 
model: we need to understand that ordinary actors, rather than sociologists, are 
equipped with genuine sociological knowledge and with competences that 
enable them to navigate their way through the social world. This knowledge, 
however, is largely implicit. As is widely recognized, it is impossible to speak and, 
simultaneously, reflect upon grammatical rules – and the same applies to social 
action. Similar to the grammarian, the sociologist is confronted with the task 
of operationalizing and formalizing the competences that are partly cognitive and 
partly shaped by everyday experience. The model has to be both developed 
and tested on the basis of research in the field. Such a conception of theory 
has little to do with critique, politics, or even with practice alone. 
  
 
Some people were quick to misrepresent our model and to use it with the 
aim of disqualifying critique or attributing value to the project of democracy. 
It is for this reason – but also for moral and political reasons, which have to do 
with the hegemony of neo-liberalism and with the social crisis in France – that 
I did not remain satisfied with this positivist self-limitation of theory for  
very long. The book The New Spirit of Capitalism, which I co-wrote with Ève 
Chiapello, was meant to contribute not only to the theoretical amplification of this 
model – from an ahistorical and static approach to a historical and dynamic 
one, which takes account of the role of power relations – but also to the practical 
aim of renewing the critique of capitalism.12 Consequently, we abandoned a merely 
positivist-descriptive position by re-establishing a link between sociology and 
critique, but without thereby completely dropping the theoretical framework 
developed in On Justification. 
 
Robin Celikates: To what extent can this revision be interpreted as a 
paradigmatic shift towards critical sociology? 
 
Luc Boltanski: In order to do sociology, one has to occupy an external position. 
If one stays within the social world, one is an expert (who, for instance, may be 
able to give hospitals advice on how to improve the way they deal with their 
patients). Sociology is a complicated endeavour: one has to act as if the social 
world were totally contingent and as if it could also be completely different. 
Starting from this assumption, it is possible to reconstruct the constitutive 
elements that allow for its coherence and robustness. The possibility of 
critique – or, to be exact, of metacritique, articulated by sociological theorists – 
presupposes that one has a description of something; otherwise there would 
be nothing to criticize. This requires an external position, a first-order exteriority. 
The entanglement between description and critique requires a complex 
exteriority, which makes it possible to assess a particular state of affairs and thereby 
take a normative stance. Real sociology must always be critical. What would be the 
point of producing a merely descriptive theory? People expect from sociology 
that it facilitates critique and that, by doing so, it contributes to the betterment 
of society. The normative underpinning of this critique cannot consist of a 
locally anchored – cultural, religious, or moral – viewpoint (which is often the 
case in everyday criticism). For sociology  makes  a claim  to being universal. Its 
normative grounds have to be sufficiently precise to make critique possible 
and, at the same time, sufficiently general to avoid being reducible to one 
particular set of moral principles. Now, does this mean that the sociology of 
critique – including its operationalization of the critical practices generated by 
actors – results in a normative and critical position? At the very least, it is possible 
to support the critique of factual orders of justification and of tests, for instance,
  
 
in the context of a local election in which all candidates belong to the same 
family. This is a reformist critique. Such a critique, however, is not particularly 
exciting; and sociology should be exciting! In everyday life, people are realists and have 
realistic expectations. Whilst a waiter working at a café may feel completely alienated 
because his colleague gets more time off than him, he may be indifferent to the 
fact that he is a waiter, rather than a university professor – c’est la vie! 
Social reality can be stronger or weaker, more rigid or more open. The 
decisive experience made in 1968 is the attenuation, and thus the opening, of 
social reality. Back then, people had dreams, not just expectations, and their 
dreams changed their expectations. In today’s world, this has ceased to be 
the case, and this is where critical sociology needs to come into play and turn 
against the dominant realism. 
 
IV 
Robin Celikates: From the outset, the theory of recognition has deeply 
critical aspirations. How does it answer the question of the normative criteria 
of critique? Can it go beyond actors’ expectations, which are often all too 
realistic? 
 
Axel Honneth: The replacement of the paradigm of communication by the paradigm of 
recognition is meant to provide access to the immanent standards of social critique. For in 
social reality there are experiences of injustice and misrecognition, upon which 
critical theory needs to draw. Yet, a twofold problem arises in this context. 
On the one hand, the notion of a struggle for recognition suffers from an 
analytical limitation. Contrary to what I used to think, the distinction between 
particular expectations and forms of recognition cannot be based solely on an 
anthropological conception of personhood and of the distinctly human need 
to develop an integral identity. Such an approach is too psychological and 
insufficiently sociological. 
On the other hand, we are confronted with a normative limitation. Notably in 
the debate with Nancy Fraser, I began to realize that the attempt to locate the 
normative standards of critique in the experiences of misrecognition involves 
the risk of regarding all expectations as justified.13 Obviously, this consequence 
would be absurd; there are enough strange, insane, and idiosyncratic expectations 
that are not justified. This is why  we need theoretical resources that permit    
us to distinguish between justified and unjustified expectations and needs for 
recognition. 
The three dimensions of recognition identified by myself – ‘legal equality’, 
‘love’, and ‘individual achievement’ – do not suffice to accomplish this, 
although what follows from them is that only those expectations are justified
  
 
which can be derived from principles related to these three aspects. It seems to 
me that this is an issue that has been largely ignored by French readers. The 
feeling of injustice is not enough to provide a solid foundation for critique. 
Both the tendency towards over-psychologization and the problem of normative 
limitation have – in light of my critical exchange with Fraser – led to internal 
corrections and improvements of my approach. 
In the course of this ‘social-theoretic turn’, the institutional orders of 
recognition have become the focus of my attention. Hence, far from being 
embedded in an ahistorical conception of personhood, the three above- 
mentioned dimensions of recognition are realized in historically given and 
evolving orders of recognition. These orders are institutionalized expressions 
of what human beings can legitimately expect in terms of recognition. What 
is central in this regard is the question of normative status, rather than the 
question of identity. We need to face up to the fact that the respective orders 
define people’s normative status. Against this background, expectations about 
recognition are justified only insofar as they represent articulations of the 
orders in which they are embedded. This picture is a sort of combination of 
Hegel and Durkheim: in the context of socialization, individuals assimilate 
the different orders and vocabularies of recognition; they learn to speak the 
language of love, of individual rights, and of performance; in addition, they 
obtain the capacity to justify their normative demands in relation to these 
principles. Subjects are socialized into the grammar of recognition, including 
their institutional manifestations. Yet, this is the case only in modern societies. 
 
Robin Celikates: Where do you think lies the main difference between orders 
of recognition, which you have just described, and orders of justification, which 
Boltanski and Thévenot examine in their works? 
 
Axel Honneth: It seems to me that there are two principal differences. First, 
orders of justification are organized in a meritocratic way. It appears, then, 
that our normative world is oriented primarily towards achievement, when, 
actually, our social reality has a much richer normative structure. Cités are 
different articulations of the principle of social esteem. The principles of  
love and respect, however, are constructed very differently and speak another 
normative language. Second, an important point of divergence concerns the 
problem of  normative orders. In On Justification, it is assumed that all possible 
principles of justification have been pre-formulated by the classics of political 
philosophy and that, therefore, they can simply be revisited. In this sense,  
we are dealing with a hermeneutic, rather than sociological, conception of 
normative orders. In my case, by contrast, the analysis of normativity follows 
the logic of a particular understanding of historical sociology: we need to
  
 
reconstruct the differentiation of different normative orders of justification. 
This corresponds to a kind of Hegelianism without a philosophy of history. The 
three spheres of recognition are elements of our conception of modernity; 
they permit us to describe the normative structure of modern societies, which 
is certainly reflected in the classical texts of modern social theory and political 
philosophy. 
 
Robin Celikates: That said, how would you define the tasks of social 
critique? And how do you make sense of the role of social theory in relation 
to the understanding that actors have of themselves? 
 
Axel Honneth: We can identify various tasks to which social theory, based on 
social critique, needs to attend. 
First, social theory reconstructs a particular historical narrative and image of 
modernity, which transcends the articulation of implicit knowledge accomplished 
by actors. This reconstruction, however, has to be reflected, at least partly, in 
the perspective of social actors, because, ultimately, they are socialized into the 
modern world and are – at least implicitly – able to distinguish between the 
different normative orders that I reconstruct as a theorist. 
Second, social theory needs to be understood as an endeavour that is 
capable of re-articulating actors’ legitimate expectations by relating them to 
their corresponding normative principles. It must be possible for social theory 
to address expectations about recognition, which are justified to the extent 
that they are formulated within these orders of  recognition.  All  of  this 
takes place at the level of re-description, rather than at the level of explicit 
criticism. The re-description aims to illustrate the moral dimension that is built 
into social conflicts. Since, however, we can observe a tendency towards false 
and one-sided self-descriptions in our societies – and since, furthermore,   
the prevailing positivism promotes these technocratic and utilitarian self- 
misunderstandings –, this alternative description, which is theoretically 
motivated, is already critical itself, even if it articulates only the implicit 
significance of social phenomena. Nowadays, for example, the demands of 
trade unions are articulated predominantly in the language of  interest, of  
pay increase, and so on and so forth. Social theory needs to provide another 
description of workers’ expectations, given that these are no longer expressed 
in the language of trade unions. We are dealing with false articulations of  
the normative dimension underlying social conflicts. And the more our social 
world is shaped by positivism and utilitarianism, the more it tends to describe 
itself and its conflicts and practices in such a reductive fashion. 
Third, it is the task of social theory to expose the moral character of articulated 
expectations as clearly as possible. This does not mean that all of these
  
 
expectations are justified; this does mean, however, that the implicit moral 
reference points of expectations and articulations need to be elucidated. In 
this sense, all critical theory does is to provide a contribution to public debate. 
On this account, which draws upon Dewey, social theory is concerned with 
supporting actors as participants in public debate and, hence, with assisting 
them to articulate their (often implicit) normative expectations and demands. 
In democratic societies, the task of justification is always a public task, rather 
than a theoretical undertaking; and this is why social theory can fulfil its critical 
mission only in the public sphere. 
Fourth, the critical task of social theory, understood in the narrow sense, 
consists in ensuring that the principles of recognition are constantly open to 
further and more radical interpretations. By definition, principles acquire      
a kind of surplus value in relation to the existing order. An order that is 
institutionalized in the name of one of these principles always falls short of 
something, because the meaning of terms such as ‘love’ and ‘justice’ is not 
conclusive; in principle, it is always possible that new aspects, which have not 
yet been considered, come into play. Theory needs to call attention to this 
surplus value – that is, to this unrealized normative potential, and it has to do so 
in a visionary manner. This, of course, leads to further problems, such as the 
question of whether the distinction between particular spheres of recognition 
is simply given and, moreover, the question of whether theory can proceed 
critically only within this framework, or whether there is a more extensive, 
transcending critique. 
 
Luc Boltanski: First of all, I wish to stress that I agree with the aforementioned 
critique of  On Justification. In order to prevent it from being misinterpreted as 
a complete description of the social world, directly after its publication I wrote 
a book on love.14 At the moment, I am working on a primarily sociological 
project, which is connected to On Justification, but which, at the same time, goes 
far beyond it, insofar as it is itself meant to provide a sort of metacritique.15 
When we are dealing with the clarification of legitimate demands – to 
which, undoubtedly, critical theory can make important contributions – we 
find ourselves in situations of radical uncertainty, which display a certain similarity 
to Hobbes’s state of nature, at least with regard to its semantic dimensions. 
Nobody knows what exactly is going on. Is this here, for instance, a gathering of 
three friends or a seminar? We are confronted with the problems of classification 
and judgement. With what kind of beings or entities are we dealing? And what 
is their respective worth? 
I distinguish between two types of situation: ‘practical’ and ‘metapragmatic’ 
ones. Situations of practical interaction can be analysed in terms of Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice. What I describe as the ‘regime of love’ is a radicalization
  
 
of the ‘regime of practice’. Actors cooperate in these situations, in order to 
interpret a given context and tolerate one another, in order to avoid having to 
undertake a test and to engage in a dispute. Let us consider the example of 
having to do the washing-up after a meal with friends: one of them continues 
to talk about sociological issues, a woman kisses her partner, and a third 
person starts clearing the table, but all of them pretend everything is in order. 
Equivalences are cast aside, and calculations are suspended. The participants 
try to ensure that they do not need to make any calculations. This allows for 
a condition of peace, as often prevails in small groups. The problem does not 
arise until the views of the situation begin to diverge substantially and/or the 
actors involved find themselves increasingly distanced from one another. In 
this case, what becomes necessary is another form of regime, which I characterize 
as ‘metapragmatic’, because it exploits the metalinguistic potential of natural 
language – that is, the possibility of speaking about language through language. 
Against this background, we face two possibilities. On the one hand, there 
is the possibility of critique: ‘You want to call this a conversation?’ On the other 
hand, there is the possibility of confirmation: ‘This is a conversation in the actual 
sense of the term.’ Here, my argument is anti-Habermasian: language is never 
capable of allowing different perspectives to converge; because human actors 
have a body, they are spatio-temporally situated, they have interests, they have 
different desires, and so on and so forth. This is why there is no reason to 
assume that one person can say, on behalf of another, that this is a bottle, 
rather than simply a piece of plastic. This is a general problem, especially if 
one steps out of the ‘regime of practice’, finds oneself in disagreement with 
others, and searches for a definition of what is actually the case. 
Now, the solution to this problem proposed by members of society consists 
in delegating the task of ascertaining what is going on (‘this is a bottle’, ‘this 
is a seminar’) to a bodiless entity – and this entity is what we call an institution. 
For this reason, I consider the following analytical distinction to be crucial: 
organizations address the problem of coordination by inventing rules; 
administrations are in charge of dealing with the problem of the police – that 
is, they ensure that rules are followed; institutions serve, above all, a semantic 
function – that is, they tell us what the situation is; and, in order to do so, 
they produce the necessary classifications (‘he is Professor at Frankfurt’, ‘she 
is a waitress at a café’, ‘this is real feta cheese’). Hence, the semantic function 
of institutions consists in continuously confirming what is going on in the world 
and, therefore, in stabilizing the world. This is indispensable, because otherwise 
everything would be uncertain and in a constant state of flux. 
 
Robin Celikates: What role does critique play in relation to institutions, 




Luc Boltanski: Institutions always provide answers to expressed criticism. 
This is why there is a permanent dialectic between institutions and critique. For the 
problem is that a bodiless entity cannot act upon the world; it cannot even 
speak. Owing to this limitation, institutions need speakers with a body or, to 
be exact, with two bodies. We can observe how speakers change their voice 
and their habits when they speak on behalf  of  an institution. This opens   
the possibility of suspicion regarding the question of whether it is really the 
bodiless entity that speaks and says what is going on, or whether, essentially, 
we are dealing with the speaker’s private opinion. It is for this reason that     
I am not convinced by Habermas; a change of perspective may allow for 
compromises and practical agreements, but it never results in the stabilization 
of a particular situation. 
Let us consider the following example, which has been examined by   
one of my students. A woman comes under the influence of a sect, and her 
friends want to help her. After a short period, both sides accuse one another 
of manipulation. Nobody actually knows, however, what a sect is and who 
manipulates whom in this case. This is what I call ‘hermeneutic contradiction’, 
and this contradiction is the precondition for the possibility of critique. If the 
world were just a conglomerate of institutions confirming what the case is, 
then there would be no critique. In fact, such a scenario would be tantamount 
to a situation of total domination. 
In this context, it is possible to distinguish between three forms of test 
[épreuve]. 
First, there are ‘truth tests’, which are developed by institutions in order to 
confirm the definition of a particular situation. Drawing upon Bourdieu, we 
can say that, in this case, we are dealing with the symbolic order whose task 
is to stabilize reality, often in the form of tautologies, such as ‘God is great’. 
‘Reality’, in this particular sense, is to be distinguished from the ‘world’. 
Whether or not ‘reality’ – as declared by institutions – concurs with the ‘world’ 
is an open question. 
Second, there are ‘reality tests’, by virtue of which it is possible to examine 
which claims are justified. If, for instance, I assert that I am capable of using a 
computer, we can check this immediately. As all sociologists of past decades 
have demonstrated, reality is constructed, but reality is not the world. The 
distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘world’ is central to metacritical processes. 
As Wittgenstein says, the world is everything that is the case. But obviously we 
do not know what the world is; and yet, it is always there, and we can always 
relate to it. 
Third, there is a type of test – in the sense of the double meaning of épreuve: 
at once, ‘test’ and ‘challenge’ – to which I refer in terms of ‘existential tests’: in 
these tests, experience is measured against established truths. Reformist critique
  
 
presupposes only the two levels of institutional ‘truth tests’ and ‘reality tests’. 
They can point to the fact that reality – think about the foregoing example   
of manipulated choice – does not correspond to the prescribed format. What 
is more, radical critique needs to make reference to existential tests. In this 
context, art and literature play a pivotal role, since they do not depend upon 
demands for justification and coherence. They can push things from the world 
into reality by producing instances that do not match the definitions underlying 
reality. Nevertheless, they still need to establish links to other persons; for, if 
one relies solely on oneself, one is simply insane, a ‘weirdo’, paranoid. Thus, 
this critique in the name of the world works only to the extent that it can relate 
to shared experiences. 
 
Robin Celikates: What exactly does critique have to oppose to the existence 
of institutions? Presumably, institutions are indispensable, are they not? 
 
Luc Boltanski: In the 1960s and 1970s, sociological studies tended to focus 
on the repressive function of institutions – that is, on their capacity to establish 
and stabilize the symbolic order; the fact that there is no society without 
institutions was disregarded. The stabilizing function of institutions is indispensable. 
At the same time, institutional demands are often exorbitant, especially when 
they are linked to the state as a large-scale system of domination (police, 
administration, etc.) or to capitalism. This leads us to a practical-political 
problem: whilst the attempt to abolish institutions (an undertaking shared   
by Bourdieu, Foucault, and others) is pointless, we need to conceive of them 
differently – that is, as fragile establishments, which can be relatively close to human 
beings and can be both transformed and criticized. Yet, how is it possible for 
this to come about? 
 
Robin Celikates: Are you implying that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
institutions? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Yes, strong institutions are bad institutions. The worst 
institutions are those that have lost all connection with reality – that is, with 
people’s experiences, which are – by definition – historical and local. We need 
go no further than to consider the Catholic Church under Pope  Benedict   
and the Soviet Union. It is only through reformist critique that institutions 
can learn something about reality. Without critique, they simply lose their 
connection with reality. Slightly less bad – but still bad – are those institutions 
that are based on the assumption that ‘reality’ and ‘world’ concur. 
Let us consider the example of economics: along with sociology, this science 
is in charge of the construction of our reality. It decides what the case is; it
  
 
decides what happens. For many economic institutions, or those influenced 
by economists, there is practically nothing that goes beyond the scope of 
their – self-defined – reality. These institutions are bad. Now, a good institution 
is not an institution incapable of providing us with a sense of security; indeed, 
this would be a mere mess, rather than an institution. A good institution is an 
institution which is aware of its limitations and recognizes them, which is open to the world 
and to the innovative processes deriving from itself. 
The question of whether or not we accept  in  reality  what  emanates 
from the world is a continuous problem. To illustrate this issue with a 
straightforward example: terrorism also originates in the world. Nevertheless, 
radical theory needs to convert itself into an advocate of the world. The new 
form of domination – and, in this sense, the early Frankfurt School was on  
to something – is no longer a form of domination on the symbolic level. The 
era of ideologies and big ceremonies is over. Nowadays, we are dealing with 
domination over reality. This is why what is at stake today is the struggle against 
reality – that is, the possibility of making reality more fragile. 
 
V 
Axel Honneth: I would like to reach a better understanding of this 
reorientation of the sociology of critique. The earlier programme proposed 
by the sociology of critique was premised on radical scepticism about the 
possibility of formulating a critique of society from a theoretical perspective 
that could claim to be superior to the critical practices of participants. What 
followed from this was the conviction that sociology needs to be conceived 
of, first and foremost, as a descriptive, rather than a critical, endeavour.  This 
self-limitation has led to a certain disenchantment, because it leaves no room 
for a more radical conception of sociology. In essence, the development of a 
new conception of metacritique is a way of reacting to this situation. Yet it 
appears that, in this context, there are two theoretical options, which are 
fundamentally different. 
According to the first option, the actors’ chances of making use of their critical 
capacities are unequally distributed and are subject to social constraints. On this view, 
the task of metacritique is to analyse these constraints. This would convert the 
‘sociology of critique’ into a ‘critical sociology’, which analyses social reality and 
institutions from a metacritical perspective, in order to find out whether they restrict 
or enhance the empowering competences of actors. In this regard, the overlaps 
with critical theory would be obvious. 
The second option relates not primarily to constraints to which individual 
actors are exposed, but, rather, to subjacent socio-ontological conditions. In situations 
of crisis and critique, there are two possible metapragmatic forms of reaction:
  
 
either the transcending of factual social interaction and the adoption of an 
external perspective (this is exactly what Habermas calls ‘discourse’: the 
disruption of normal practice and the adoption of a reflexive attitude); or 
delegation to an institutional authority and the reliance upon its definition of 
reality (for Habermas, this belongs to the lifeworld). Institutions always offer 
solutions to practical problems by providing definitions, descriptions, and 
classifications of reality. On this account, the task of critical sociology consists 
in examining whether these institutions are sufficiently flexible, or whether they 
are enclosed and ossified. The metacritical perspective has an interest in the flux 
and development of social life; it opposes unduly rigid institutional constraints. 
Thus, the criterion is as follows: do institutions include the world, or do they 
exclude it? Strictly speaking, this second option does not constitute a normative 
critique. What is crucial in this regard are not injustices but social pathologies, 
which have to do with the functionality or dysfunctionality of institutions – that 
is, with the fact that social reality cuts itself off from the world and, in addition, 
with the fact that it becomes one-dimensional and overly institutionalized. 
Hence, we can distinguish between two forms of critique. A reformist critique 
ensues within the given institutional horizon and is aimed at enhancing the 
functioning of existing institutions. A radical critique would question the social 
and existential, as well as the ethical, quality of these institutions. The reference 
point of such a critique can be found not in social injustices, but in social 
pathologies, which concern the relationship between social reality and the 
world. This means, however, that one moves away from the first option, which 
relates to the sociology of critique and, by analysing the social conditions and 
constraints impacting upon the development of critical capacities, bestows 
upon it a ‘critical turn’. 
 
Luc Boltanski: Without a doubt, the  problem  of  inequality  between  
actors – particularly in terms of their unequal access to critique – is an issue 
we need to take very seriously. This, however, is not the point in which I am 
interested at the moment. Perhaps I can elucidate my current question as 
follows: according to Thomas S. Kuhn’s analysis, in a laboratory, many things 
that do not make sense happen; it is only when this occurs too often that these 
things have to be taken seriously and have to be considered more carefully. In 
these cases, we do not know what exists in reality, let alone what exists in the 
world; it is only when the gap between the two becomes too big that a real 
problem emerges. 
This applies also to the sociological perspective. My wife once told me how 
she became a feminist. She was a member of a Maoist group, in which women 
always had to be in charge of the unpleasant tasks, such as cooking, putting 
up posters, and so on and so forth. At some point, its female members decided
  
 
to have a meeting in order to discuss the situation. Thereafter, they could say 
‘as a woman …’; before, they could say only ‘as a Maoist …’. The problem 
existed in the world, but not in the reality of Maoists. And this is precisely what 
changed due to their conversation. 
 
Axel Honneth: Well, this is a problem of the description one choses to use. 
According to your description, your wife has invented a new language for 
something in the world that the world exposes in social reality. One could 
also suggest that it articulates an implicit experience, which is normative 
itself, and that it refers to exactly those normative principles that are already 
recognized within the group. The language of justificatory practices is an alternative 
to the world/reality-vocabulary. My own understanding of the metacritical role of 
critical theory is much closer to the first – normative – vocabulary than to the 
second – rather non-normative – socio-ontological description. 
 
Luc Boltanski: Perhaps Marx is the only one who has tried to provide solid 
foundations for critique, not in terms of  a particular morality,  but in terms  
of immanent social contradictions. I do not want to sound presumptuous,  
but I wish to stress that I search for an immanent contradiction that allows for 
the grounding of critique compatible with a pragmatic and interpretive 
approach. This is why I speak about a hermeneutic contradiction: an immanent 
contradiction between the necessity of institutions and their limitations. This 
is a contradiction that is built into social reality. What I mean by ‘hermeneutic 
contradiction’ is not a contradiction between different interpretations, but     
a contradiction inherent in the very task of interpreting. Surely, it can have 
moral implications, but it is not itself grounded in morality. And this is why 
the critique that is based upon this contradiction is not a normative critique in 
the narrow sense of the term. It relates to the world as something that always 
goes beyond the scope of reality. 
 
Axel Honneth: I ask myself, though, if this view involves the risk of losing sight 
of moral-sociological questions. For this perspective focuses on the semantic 
performance of institutions, rather than on their moral and normative 
function. One could, however, describe institutions in a different way and put 
the emphasis not on the semantic task of establishing and stabilizing reality, 
but on the normative role of institutions. Institutions fix people’s normative status 
and link them to sanctions. Critique should also contribute to this function. 
 
Luc Boltanski: Why do I suggest that the difference between ‘world’ and ‘reality’ 
is so central? In On  Justification  we have tended to overlook those expectations 
and demands made by human actors which do not already correspond to social
  
 
reality and to established orders of justification. This is something I have learned 
during the field studies that I conducted for my book The Foetal Condition: A 
Sociology of Engendering and Abortion.16 I do not believe in ideologies to which people 
are subjected; only rulers need ideologies, because it is very difficult to rule. 
Yet, people have many experiences for which there is no language and about 
which, consequently, they cannot talk. For instance,  my  grandmother  – who 
had emigrated from Russia – lived in an extremely poor reality, but in an 
extraordinarily rich – and, in her case, imaginative – world, which she was not 
able to express; even in the context of her immediate family, she could share her 
world only with her kids. An ethnologist with whom I became friends once told 
me that the sociology of critique that we had developed would work only within 
the area surrounded by the Parisian ring road [Boulevard périphérique de Paris]! 
I think that, to some extent, she is right. The fact that we do not understand 
something does not mean that we can regard it as normatively irrelevant. Critique 
has to strengthen the world – even if it is difficult to grasp – against reality. 
 
Robin Celikates: You have just mentioned Marx as an important reference 
point for this reorientation. What role does the concept of class play in your 
analysis of society? 
 
Luc Boltanski: ‘Class’ is one of the most important concepts in  the 
history of sociology. Yet, within only one decade, it has almost completely 
disappeared. In some respects, the criticisms levelled against this concept are 
certainly justified. For example, the assumption that there is a space – that is, 
society – which is divided into homogenous strata is utterly misguided. Only a 
pragmatic approach can revive the analysis of class. Classes are always practical phenomena. 
The key question is as follows: how is it possible that a small group can 
exploit the large majority? The only plausible answer to this question is 
that, whereas the small group is integrated, the large group is fragmented. 
If the majority seeks to overcome this fragmentation process with the aim 
of strengthening itself, it needs to create explicit connections, discipline itself, 
form a party, and so on and so forth. To be sure, the ruling classes do not 
conceive of themselves as ‘the ruling classes’, but as ‘the elite’. I call them ‘the 
responsible ones’ – and the ambiguity is deliberate. 
How, then, do ‘the responsible ones’ succeed in building connections with 
one another which enable them to secure their position of power? There is 
some kind of tacit agreement amongst them, which also manifests itself in relation 
to social rules. For instance, when one talks to a ‘responsible’ who is accused 
of fraud, he or she will say that they could not have achieved what they had 
achieved if they had strictly followed the rules; he or she does think, however, 
that they need rules. This implies an asymmetry between those who have to follow
  
 
the rule and those who dispose of some sort of secret knowledge, according to 
which the rule cannot be adhered to in all situations. Of course, the latter, unlike 
the former, have the power to act correspondingly. From a normative point of 
view, we are dealing with a very dubious way of using institutional power. In 
contrast to this account, which portrays social reality as marked by class-specific 
asymmetries, my own normative vision refers to a society in which everyone 
would take the initiative – that is, in which everyone would acknowledge that, 
although rules are obviously necessary, they cannot be unconditionally valid. 
This would be a society shaped primarily by liberty, rather than by difference. 
 
Robin Celikates: What status do the aforementioned immanent 
contradictions have in this regard? The question which arises in this context, 
and which is far from easy to answer in relation to Marx, can be formulated as 
follows: can these contradictions be considered objective ones, belonging to the 
very structure of society, or are we dealing with an interpretive reconstruction 
of social reality, which is proposed by the theorist and which is not necessarily 
superior to other forms of social self-understanding? 
 
Luc Boltanski: I have to admit that I am annoyed by my insufficient knowledge 
of anthropology. Unlike sociologists, anthropologists tend to be aware of the 
fact that the world – including, evidently, the social world – is a big mess, rather than an 
ordered whole. Under these circumstances, it is almost impossible to produce 
something like ‘a collective’; even if we endorse an optimistic conception of 
humanity, we need to accept that we are dealing with a kind of miracle. This is 
due to the various and unresolvable immanent contradictions, which should also be 
addressed by sociology. Even Marx has failed to do so in a convincing manner; 
too often does he treat social relations as a given, rather than as something that 
is very difficult to establish. Social relations are always an extraordinarily fragile 
construction. Yet, Marx underestimates the enormous symbolic accomplishments 
that are necessary for the consolidation of productive relations. 
 
Robin Celikates: From the perspective of critical theory, it would be possible 
to formulate something similar as follows: it is theory’s metacritical task to uncover the 
immanent contradictions concealed by institutions, which act as if these contradictions did not 
exist in the first place. A sort of reification conceals the actual fragility of social 
reality. Or should we elucidate the normative basis of the aforementioned 
form of critique in a different way? 
 
Luc Boltanski: To begin with, the normative basis consists in the moral 
conviction that there should be a society without exclusion – that is, without 
an excluded rest that finds no place in the social order. Modern liberal societies
  
 
have always excluded a great number of people. Perhaps the following moral 
postulation is enough: there should be no rest, no second-rank people, no rubbish. The 
reference to ‘immanent contradictions’, by contrast, is not exactly ‘normative’ 
in the narrow sense of the term. ‘Immanent contradictions’, as I understand 
them, constitute a source of constraint to which people respond by mobilizing 
their reflexive resources. Thus, the existence of ‘immanent contradictions’ can 
be conceived of as a normative prerequisite for the construction of social reality. 
 
Robin Celikates: Does this mean that we can criticize any form of exclusion by 
referring to a more inclusive order? How is this linked to the assumption that the 
‘world’ is always more than ‘reality’? Would this not mean that there is no such 
thing as complete inclusion and that, in this sense, there will always be a ‘rest’? 
 
Luc  Boltanski: The critics’ attention should always be directed towards   
the world. This is due to the fact that, in the world, there are always people 
who knock at the door of social reality, but who are denied entry. Nowadays, 
even the political left argues that our societies cannot accept all immigrants. 
Yet, it is precisely because of this that these marginalized groups become a 
revolutionary, transformative force. 
 
Axel Honneth: I would also say that the normative intuition of a society that does 
not exclude anybody – that is, of a community in which everyone is considered 
a fully fledged member – is fundamental. In essence, this is what is meant by 
what I describe as ‘recognition’ and, alternatively, by what Nancy Fraser calls 
‘participation’. At the same time, there is another intuition behind the idea of     
a transcending critique, at which Luc Boltanski has just hinted: namely, an intuition 
concerning the existence of societies in relation to the rest of the world. The 
critique drawing upon this intuition is concerned not with the members of 
society but with the question of how the world can be brought to bear within reality. 
 
Robin Celikates: And these are two competing intuitions, one of which is 
‘normative’ or ‘moral’ and one of which is ‘socio-ontological’, perhaps in the 
sense referred to by Cornelius Castoriadis or by Bruno Latour. 
 
Luc Boltanski: This question takes us back to the connection between 
sociology and metacritique. The first intuition makes metacritique both 
necessary and possible, whereas the second intuition accomplishes the same 
thing with sociology. We have to try to integrate the two intuitions. Surely, the 
world is composed not only of the social, but also of many entities – such as 
deities, catastrophes, and so on and so forth – which are not social, but which 
are nonetheless of fundamental significance for our social reality. In order
  
 
to be able to describe society accurately, it is necessary to relate to the world, 
which is not wrapped up in social reality. 
 
Axel Honneth: I would like to relate what has just been said to the concept 
of critique and propose a division of labour between two forms of critique: 
between a critique of social injustices (which is always motivated by a moral 
intuition), on the one hand, and a critique of social pathologies (which are related 
to intuitions about the good life), on the other. Intuitions regarding institutional 
modes of functioning are, above all, concerned with facilitating the possibility 
of a good life, rather than with justice in the relationship between persons. 
Ultimately, ontological intuitions – according to which institutions should not 
be too rigid and enclosed – relate to ethical intuitions about the good life. 
These are, however, two very different perspectives on society and also two 
very different forms of social critique. 
 
Robin  Celikates: Yet,  Luc Boltanski must have  another form of  critique   
in mind, because even the critique of social pathologies, which inhibit the 
possibility of the good life and which lead to the loss of identity and meaning, 
is formulated always in the name of those who suffer from them. Ontological 
critique shall speak on behalf of the world – of a world which does not consist 
of humans, animals, and other entities, but which, for the time being, needs to 
remain totally indeterminate. Anything that goes further is already a classification 
and, thus, part of social reality, institutional effects, and precisely not the world 
anymore. This third form of critique ties in with Latour and sounds almost 
Heideggerian: the world shall disclose itself [sich entbergen] and show itself 
[sich zeigen], and it is the task of critique to make this possible. 
 
Axel Honneth: One could suggest, however, that we – as subjects, who, by 
definition, are affected by the world and by its way of impacting upon social 
reality – have an interest in this kind of ontological critique of over-institutionalization. 
Human actors suffer indirectly from institutions that are too rigid, because 
they have no access to the world and lack the capacity to articulate those 
dimensions of their own self that are a product of this world. It is in this 
sense that we are dealing with social pathologies in this context. It is certainly 
true, though, that the point of  reference for such a critique would have  to  
be something that corresponds to what Castoriadis describes as ‘magma’: the 
indeterminate world out there, beyond the cultural constructions of which 
society is comprised. 
To reiterate this point: such a criticism (which is levelled against the rigidity 
of  institutions – that is, against the fact that they constantly fulfil the function  
of the normative regulation of reality, but without providing the world, or the
  
 
non-identical in the Adornian sense, with a soundboard) is not expressed in the 
name of a social group or class, which would be discriminated against or excluded. 
If one can say so, we all suffer from the enclosure of institutions in relation to desires, 
impulses, or imaginative thinking, for which – due to semantic fixations – we 
have not yet been able to find an accurate language. In this respect, perhaps it 
is possible to talk of a ‘disclosing critique’, whose task is to draw our attention 
to life forms, ways of relating to one another, and ways of relating to ourselves 
which – because of the normative regulation of reality – are still being excluded. 
From this endeavour, however, we have to distinguish a form of social critique 
that, on behalf of particular groups, criticizes social states of affairs regarded as 
unjustified, and therewith unjust, because they breach institutionally established 
principles. What is criticized here are institutional practices or governmental 
measures, by which we are not all equally affected, but which adversely affect 
some groups more than others. To the extent that such a critique is not based on 
abstract and simply obligatory norms, it must be able to invoke institutionalized, 
and thus widely accepted, principles. Such a critique, then, must proceed in 
a reconstructive manner, in the sense that it unveils the norms underlying socio- 
historical processes, which – owing to their institutionalization – appear to have 
a certain degree of social acceptability. On the basis of these principles, it is 
possible to pursue social critique in two directions: either we rely upon the already 
well-practised interpretations of these principles, in order to suggest that they 
are not adequately applied to particular groups, or we draw attention to a certain 
normative excess – that is, a ‘validity surplus’ – of these principles, in order 
to demonstrate that more social justice would be required than that which is 
already established within the given practices and institutions. 
 
Luc Boltanski: The relation to the world does not have to be emancipatory. 
The so-called ruling classes change reality and justify this by referring to 
changes in the world. For  instance, given that labour processes have  been  
so radically transformed, workers shall no longer be called ‘workers’. This 
illustrates that, unfortunately, the world is a resource not only for the political 
left, but also for the political right. By all means, it does matter which aspects 
of the world critique seeks to address and how it brings them to bear in reality. 
The descriptive-ontological side and the normative side of critique cannot be 
separated from one another without any implications. In any case, the main task 
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